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Intellect and the Structuring of Reality
in Plotinus and Averroes
John Hendrix

Though Averroes is not generally considered to be sympathetic to
Neoplatonic thinking, there are definite parallels between the philosophies of intellect of Averroes and Plotinus. Both can be considered to
be “Idealists” in that intelligible form precedes sensible form in perception, and that the material intellect of Averroes or Reason Principle
of Plotinus, nous hylikos or pathetikos, depends in its functioning on
the agent intellect of Averroes or Intellectual Principle of Plotinus,
nous poietikos. The formation of the image in the oculus mentis is coincident with the formation of a thought, and the sensible form is a
transient residue of the permanent intelligible form, as if it is reflected
in a mirror and projected on a surface. For both philosophers, material
intellect and intellect not connected to sense perception are mediated
by a kind of intellectus in habitu, a practicing intellect which leads the
individual to higher forms of understanding. The development of
phantasmata or imprints of forms in the oculus mentis in the imagination or phantasia is the product of a dialectical relation between the
mechanisms of sense perception in material intellect and an a priori
understanding of forms in the intelligible, prior to the sensible. In order to be perceived, forms must be constructed, in a structuring of reality.
Plotinus was born in Lycopolis circa 205 and died in Campania in
270. Averroes, or Ibn Rushd, was born in Córdoba in 1126 and died in
Marrakech in 1198. In the Enneads of Plotinus, I.6.3, shape is not
something which is inherent to objects in sensual reality, but is rather
something which is imposed upon objects by human thought, in the
nature of geometry and ordering principles. The sensible form given
by the material intellect connected to sense perception is already a
product of intellection. The shape of the impression of the form of the
object in Plotinus is something conceived, and joined to the material
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object before it is received as an impression; the shape of the object is
part of the a priori vocabulary by which intellect orders the sensual
world, and reaffirms the existence of the perceiving subject in the
world. For Plotinus, “So with the perceptive faculty: discerning in certain objects the Ideal-Form which has bound an controlled shapeless
matter, opposed in nature to Idea, seeing further stamped upon the
common shapes some shape excellent above the common, it gathers
into unity what still remains fragmentary, catches it up and carries it
within…”1
The form and shape which intellect imposes on bodies are mechanisms of intellect in sense perception. As Averroes explains in the
Long Commentary on the De anima, 3.1.5,2 “It is necessary to assign
two subjects to these actually existing intelligibles,” the intelligible as
it exists in the form of the sensory object, “one of which is the subject
due to which the intelligibles are true, i.e., forms, which are truthful
images, the other, the subject due to which the intelligibles are only a
single one of the entities in the world, and this is the material intellect
itself.” The intellect of the perceiving subject in sensory perception is
as responsible for how the sensible world is perceived as the forms
which are assigned to the sensible world.
Sense perception transfers the form of the body or material entity,
as conceptualized, according to Plotinus, “no longer a thing of parts,
and presents it to the Ideal-Principle as something concordant and
congenial…” (Enneads I.6.3); the perceived form must correspond to
the preconception of it, the intelligible form. Dianoia or discursive
reason, actualized material intellect, described as “the reasoningprinciple in the Soul” in Enneads V.3.2, makes judgments about the
sensible form given to it, which is already the product of judgments of
the higher intellect, the Intellectual Principle, nous poietikos, the presence of active intellect in actualized intellect, and organizes them in
combinations and divisions, corresponding to geometry and mathematics. As the phantasmata or imprints of forms come to reasoning
power from intellect, “reasoning will develop to wisdom where it recognizes the new and late-coming impressions (those of sense) and
adapts them, so to speak, to those it holds from long before…,” according to Plotinus, as in an actualized intellect or intellectus in
habitu. Perception is the product of experience in the interaction of
thought and the sensible world, the dialectic of the incorporeal and
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corporeal, the universal and particular.
In Enneads V.3.3, if sense perception is to “develop the impression received, it distinguishes various elements in what the representative faculty has set before it,” and if it makes a judgment on the form,
“while it has spoken on information from the senses, its total pronouncement is its own…” Discursive reason in material intellect does
nothing other than process images of forms which it has already defined itself, through the relation between active intellect and material
intellect, Intellectual Principle and Reason Principle. Without the capacity to understand the intelligible, the intelligible form in relation to
the sensible form, material intellect can only be unaware of the reality
of the sensible world which is perceived, and unaware of the role that
it plays in the formation and definition of the sensible world which it
perceives as external to itself.
For Plotinus there can be no immediate sense perception of an object, without the mediation of the mirror reflection of the intelligible
form of the object in intellect. In Enneads I.1.8, the intelligible form in
intellect becomes the sensible form in sense perception, “not by merging into body but by giving forth, without any change in itself, images
or likenesses of itself like one face caught by many mirrors,” in the
same way that active intellect presents the intelligible to acquired intellect. Acquired intellect is only capable of receiving the intelligible
to the extent of its limitations, as differentiated or sequentially arranged, in the same way that the mirror is only capable of receiving an
image according to its corporeal state, adjusted in size and position.
The discerning of impressions printed upon the intellect by sensation for Plotinus is the function of discursive reason, not immediate
sense perception. Since the sensual impressions in perception are copies and derivatives of intelligible forms, perception itself is a copy and
derivative of reason. Reason in Plotinus is composed of mnemic residues of perceived objects, what Plotinus calls “imprints” in “recollections” in Enneads V.3.2. Thoughts are propelled by the desire created
by the multiple and fragmented images of perception as reconstructed
in reason. In Enneads IV.7.6, sense perceptions merge together in reason like lines coming together from the circumference of the circle,
from multiplicity to unity, subject to the ruling principles. In reality,
sense objects are variable and differentiated in terms of size and location; they are multiple and fragmented, and it is only the reason of the
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perceiver which allows them to be apprehended as whole and congruent. Sense objects themselves cannot be immediately perceived as a
congruent whole. Once the diverse and multiple sense objects have
been transformed into a whole by apprehension in sense perception,
they cannot return to their original state. Apprehension permanently
transforms sensual reality in conformance with the principles of reason.
Perception, according to Plotinus, divides, multiplies, and otherwise organizes sensual reality; in other words, perception is an intellective process, the most basic exercises of which are mathematics and
geometry. Perceived objects are divided and organized into parts
which correspond directly to the organizational capacities of reason.
The relation of parts and subdivisions to the whole and to infinity is
the same in the sense object as it is in reasoning capacity. Geometry
and mathematics are the mechanisms by which sensual reality is represented by perception to reason, though sense objects do not inherently contain geometrical and mathematical properties.
For Plotinus, discursive reason approaches nous when reason recognizes its recent sense impressions and “gathers into unity what still
remains fragmentary, catches it up and carries it within,” the mnemic
residues or memory traces of previous sense impressions, in a process
of reminiscence. In the Enneads, while perception grasps the “impressions printed upon the Animate by sensation” (I.1.7), through the
mnemic residue, a perception is a mental image for that which is going
to remember it, and the memory and the retention of the object belongs
to the image-making power (IV.3.29), or the imagination or phantasia.
In the representation in the mnemic residue, the intelligible form is
present after the sensible form or perception is gone. Through memory, “every mental act is accompanied by an image,” as described in
Enneads IV.3.30. Through the intelligible form the intellectual act is
without parts and has not come out into the open, but remains unobserved within, unknown to Reason Principle.
The function of language, or the extent to which language can
function, is as the mirror reflection of the intellectual in discursive
reason, in the facilitation of memory, in that, as Plotinus says, the verbal expression unfolds its content and brings it out of the intellectual
act into the image-making power, and so shows the intellectual act as
if in a mirror, and this is how there is apprehension and persistence
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and memory of it. The mechanism of perception mediates between the
sensible world of objects in nature and the inaccessible intellectual, or
nous, in a dialectical process between the subject and the world. There
must be an affection which lies between the sensible and the intelligible, as Plotinus puts it, a proportional mean somehow linking the two
extremes to each other (IV.6.1), the sensible form and the intelligible
form. In the perception of an object, the object is already apprehended
by the perceiving subject in relation to the perceiving mechanism, the
construction of intellect involving the mnemic residue and the intelligible form, through the use of geometry, as vision is understood in relation to geometry and mathematics, the intelligible mechanisms as
the underlying structure.
In the Long Commentary on the De anima 3.1.5, Averroes posits
three intelligences in the anima rationalis or the rational soul: agent
intellect, material or passible intellect, and speculative or actualized
intellect, also called acquired intellect. While material intellect is
“partly generable and corruptible, partly eternal,” corporeal and incorporeal, the speculative and agent intellects are purely eternal and incorporeal. Actualized intellect is the final entelechy, or final
actualization of potentiality. It is a form of intellectus in habitu, which
can be both passive and active, corporeal and incorporeal. Material intellect is a possible intellect, a possibility, because it is both corporeal
and incorporeal, thus neither corporeal nor incorporeal. Material intellect becomes actualized intellect through the affect of the agent intellect, which illuminates, as a First Cause, the intelligible form or forma
imaginativa, the residue of the sensible form, the sensation, in the anima rationalis. The illuminated intelligible acts on material intellect
until material intellect becomes actualized intellect, at which point intellect is able to act on the intelligible.
The formae imaginativae, as the basis of actualized intellect, are
both corporeal and incorporeal; they bridge the gap or merge the two
in the process of intellection. The formae imaginativae, like the sensations of which they are residues, are partially connected to the material
or corporeal, and cannot be archetypes from without, but intelligibles
within human intellect. The affect of active intellect on material intellect toward actualized intellect is a combination of the illumination
and the resulting mechanisms of intellectus in habitu. The effect is in
the combination of the receptivity of material intellect as a passive
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substratum of cognitive and intellectual activity, like a blank tablet,
and the will or desire on the part of the thinking subject to develop
cognitive and intellectual virtus.
In the De anima 3.1.5, the existence of intelligibles or first principles in intellect, as they are understood in actualized intellect, “does
not simply result from the reception of the object,” the sensible form
in sense perception in material intellect, “but consists in attention to,
or perception of, the represented forms…,” the cognition of the forms
in actualized intellect wherein they can be understood as intelligibles,
which requires both the participation of active intellect and the motivation of the individual for intellectual development. The goal of intellectual development is to achieve union with active intellect, the final
entelechy, and through this union the highest bliss in life can be
achieved. Such bliss can only be achieved “in the eve of life.”
Material intellect, in that it is only a possibility, contains neither
actual intellectual cognition nor a faculty for intellectual cognition.
Both of these are only possible in actualized intellect, through intellectus in habitu, acquired intellect, and the affect of agent intellect. Material intellect contains only the possibility of being united with active
intellect; all material intellects are equally potential. Intellectus in
habitu is developed as the oculus mentis of the anima rationalis develops a vocabulary of images or phantasmata stored in the imaginatio or phantasia. The phantasm, sensible form, is corporeal, and
potentially intelligible, as the material intellect has the potential to understand the intelligible. The sensible form can only potentially be an
intelligible form if it is predetermined by the intelligible form. In the
De anima, 3.5.36, “this sort of action,” of the agent intellect, “which
consists in generating intelligibles and actualizing them, exists in us
prior to the action of the intellect,” prior to the formation of the sensible form in imaginatio. The corporeal condition of material intellect
acts as a substrate for actualized and agent intellect, the partially and
completely incorporeal, only as a blank tablet on which letters are
written. The corporeal presence of the letters, the sensible form in
phantasia, is predetermined by the writing of the letters, based on the
idea of the letter, the intelligible form, which pre-exists the letter itself.
The passible intellect is able to distinguish and compare individual
sensory representations, the sensible form, in the virtus aestimativa or
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virtus cogitativa, which provides the material substrate for intellectus
in habitu. The virtus aestimativa or virtus cogitativa might also be ascribed to the sensus communis, common sense. In distinguishing and
comparing the phantasmata in imaginatio, intellect applies shape and
form to otherwise nebulous, inchoate images. It also organizes them in
totalities, in the most rudimentary processes of abstraction, and defines them in relation to organizational systems, such as geometry and
mathematics. Averroes suggests that the sensory powers themselves
entail an element of intellection, in that the imprint of the sensible
form would depend on the formation of the intelligible form. In the De
anima 3.1.7, “the cogitative faculty,” virtus cogitativa, “belongs to the
genus of sensible faculties. But the imaginative and the cogitative and
the recollective” faculties, imaginatio, ratio and memoria, “all cooperate in producing the image of the sensible thing, so that the separate
rational faculty can perceive it,” as a reflected image in the oculus
mentis, “and extract the universal intention,” the intelligible form,
“and finally receive, i.e., comprehend it.”
The sensible form in the oculus mentis exists as a potential intelligible, and the material intellect, which is engaged in the formation of
the sensible form, is capable of receiving the intelligible from the active intellect. The material intellect is the passible intellect described
by Aristotle in De anima 3.5.430a24, which distinguishes and compares the individual representations of sense experience in the oculus
mentis. Averroes compares intellectus passibilis to phantasia or
imaginatio, or imagination, in De anima 3.1.20, the image-making virtus or power of intellect in the formation of the phatasmata of the sensible form. Following Aristotle, Averroes divides material intellect
into the sensus communis, or sense perception, the phantasia, the virtus cogitativa, and memoria, in ascending order from corporeal to
spiritual, as the active intellect is increasingly engaged. The material
intellect cannot distinguish or apprehend intelligibles on its own. The
material, passible intellect, is an acquired intellect, through the activities of phantasia and memoria, and it is based in the acquisition of habitual knowledge through exercise, the gymnastics of discursive
reason, dianoia, as a material intellectus in habitu. The passible intellect operates according to its capacity for receptivity, not according to
an ability to form concepts or abstractions.
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Intellectual knowledge for Averroes must be distinguished from
the habitual knowledge of passible intellect. Intellectual knowledge is
the product of the merging of the intellectus materialis, which is considered to be incorporeal, despite its dependence on the sensible form,
and the active intellect, which transforms the sensible form into the
intelligible form, stripping it of its corporeal attachment and converting it from a particular to a universal, which makes the potentially intelligible phantasmata in the oculus mentis intelligible. The intellectus
agens is the intellect which acts, which moves the material intellect,
the intellect which only receives or is affected, in De anima 3.1.5. The
active intellect allows the material intellect to be moved by imagination. The intellectus passibilis, as virtus cogitativa in combination
with phantasia and memoria, forms the phantasm or sensible form in
order that it can be perceived by the intellectus agens, and prepares it
to receive the intellectus agens, by which the sensible form becomes
the intelligible, which can be comprehended as a universal.
In the De anima, the transformation from potentiality to actuality
takes place in the speculative intellect, which includes the intellectus
in habitu, and is distinguished from the agent or productive intellect,
intellectus agens, and the material or passible intellect, intellectus
passibilis.3 The actualizing of the material intellect by the productive
intellect is the result of the productive intellect illuminating the residues of sensations existing in the mind, the formae imaginativae, or
mnemic resides. The formae act on the material intellect after they
have been illuminated, and material intellect is transformed into speculative intellect, which combines the material and productive intellects, the physical and eternal or archetypal, corporeal and incorporeal.
The formae imaginativae themselves are both physical and archetypal,
sensible and intelligible.
Averroes describes the material intellect, intellectus materialis, or
passible intellect, as the transparent medium in relation to the intellectus agens, as light. As with Plotinus, in the relation between nous and
discursive reason, the activity of the intellectus agens must precede
that of the intellectus materialis. In the intellectus passibilis, individual representations are distinguished, in the virtus aestimativa naturalis. The material form is seen as color in relation to the light, from
the intellectus passibilis, the intentio in the imaginative faculty, or
phantasia. In other words, as Averroes says in De anima 3.3.18, “the

9

relation of the intentions in imagination to the material intellect is the
same as the relation of the sensible to the senses.”4 The material intellect receives the active intellect, or agent intellect, in the same way
that transparent bodies “receive light and colors at the same time; the
light, however, brings forth the colors” in De anima 3.5.36. The intelligible form results from the cooperation of the material and agent intellects.
As in Plotinus, when the intelligible is received by the material intellect, it is subject to generation and corruption, multiplicity and accident. The intelligible form, when it is connected to the sensible form
in material intellect, is not a permanent mnemic residue as an archetype, but is fluctuating and impermanent in its corporeal manifestation. But the intelligible form does not disappear when its
corresponding sensible form does, it merely ceases to participate in the
sensible form. In De anima 3.1.5, “And if intelligibles of this kind are
considered, insofar as they have being simpliciter and not in respect of
some individual,” as universals, “then it must truly be said of them
that they have eternal being, and that they are not sometimes intelligibles and sometimes not, but that they always exist in the same manner…” The intelligible form can participate in the sensible form of its
own volition, or the volition of the agent intellect, but the sensible
form cannot participate in the intelligible form, in its corporeal limitations, in the same way that color, for example, because it is tied to the
corporeal body, cannot participate in light, although they are perceived
simultaneously and are undifferentiated in perception.
According to Averroes, all individual material intellects are capable of some ability to form concepts and abstract ideas at a basic level,
but beyond that intellectual development varies among individuals according to the level of volition. Intelligibles are apprehended the more
completely as knowledge of the material world is greater, as knowledge of sensible objects depends on knowledge of intelligibles. Complete knowledge of the material world results in complete unity
between the material intellect and the active intellect, the final entelechy achieved in the “eve of life.” Knowledge and understanding are
possible only in actualized intellect, which must no longer be potential
intellect. Intellectual knowledge, and philosophy itself, which is eternal, as an intelligible, must be seen as the ultimate goal of human life,
and the cause of the most perfect bliss.
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